We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of di¤erenti-ated goods and multi-product retailers. We …nd that, under both types of contracts (linear and two-part tari¤s), only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product di¤erentiation and link costs: the non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing network, the exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing network, and a mixed distribution network in which both exclusive and non-exclusive relations are observed. Moreover, the stability of the …rst two networks is robust to the case of manufacturers with no bargaining power and the case of di¤erentiated retailers who compete in prices. We show that, under both types of contracts, the distribution networks that maximize social welfare are not necessarily stable. Thus, a con ‡ict between stability and social welfare is likely to occur, even more if the degree of product di¤erentiation is low enough.
Unquestionably, networks govern relations among …rms in an important manner. In various industries, such as automobiles, clothing, electronics, pharmaceuticals and food, manufacturers develop networks of exchange both with input suppliers and retailers or wholesalers. Moreover, in the last few decades the importance of spot exchange in input or output procurement has decreased in favor of other methods such as manufacturer-supplier long-term contracting and manufacturer-retailer exchange networks. The relevance of interconnections in networks structures has grown notably (see e.g. Nishiguchi (1994) for the automobile industry), and it seems that …rms increasingly rely on a subset of suppliers with whom they maintain close business ties. This paper examines network formation between manufacturers of di¤erentiated goods and retailers, who then sell them to consumers. We look into the tradeo¤ between building costly links and the nature of intrabrand, interbrand and in-store rivalry. Our analysis provides a rather general understanding of vertical distribution networks, and we further study whether the self-interest of the agents results in stable distribution networks that might maximize social welfare.
Our work is related with two di¤erent strands of the literature. Firstly, there is the literature on network formation, which has mainly focused on the upstream part of the vertical chain, thereby neglecting the analysis of the downstream part where manufacturers and retailers enter into long-term relationships. 1 Kranton and Minehart (2001) have studied why buyers and sellers form bilateral links on which they mutually agree, and whether the individual incentives of agents are aligned with social welfare. Kranton and Minehart (2000b) have examined the competitive equilibrium prices in buyer-seller networks, whereas Wang and Watts (2006) have considered the case when sellers can produce goods of a di¤erent quality. Finally, Kranton and Minehart (2000a) have looked at the emergence of buyer-seller networks when sellers have an outsourcing motivation to see whether networks can perform better than vertically integrated markets or spot exchange markets. Manufacturers can decide to build a dedicated asset to produce their own inputs or, alternatively, they can invest in links to external sellers from which they will buy specialized inputs. We contribute to this literature by characterizing the networks that will emerge between asymmetric groups of agents whose architecture, in addition to the usual costs of link formation, depends on the type and intensity of competition involved in a 1 The data in Betancourt (2004) suggests that there has been substantial forward vertical integration by manufacturers in the form of internalizing the wholesale function by selling directly to retailers. This process is most pronounced in the durable sectors: automobiles and other motor vehicles, 95.5 percent of sales; electronics, 70.9 percent of sales; toys and hobby goods, 95.6 percent of sales (US retail sector in 1987). particular network. We …nd a relation between the level of product di¤erentiation and the link cost level as determinants of the "stable" distribution networks. 2 Secondly, there exist a number of papers devoted to the analysis of distribution systems that arise when there is market power at both the manufacturing and retailing levels. Earlier literature has mainly addressed two questions: i) whether manufacturers would prefer having a single common retailer rather than separate exclusive retailers and, ii) whether a manufacturer's brand should be excluded from the market by use of exclusive contracts. 3 Recent contributions on the incentives of manufacturers and retailers to sign exclusivity arrangements 4 include Chang (1992), Dobson and Waterson (1996) , and Moner-Colonques, Sempere-Monerris and Urbano (2004) . Results are sensitive to how the arrangements are determined, to the degree of product di¤erentiation, to brand asymmetry, and to the existence of retailer di¤erentiation. Mycielski, Riyanto and Wuyts (2000) have studied the manufacturers'choice of vertical arrangements considering territorial exclusivity. In contrast with the received literature, manufacturers are not given the leading role in shaping the distribution systems. The network approach that we undertake allows us to endogenize the creation of manufacturer-retailer bilateral links, and o¤er an economic intuition of the forces delineating distribution systems. The resulting networks of manufacturers and retailers neither follow from cooperative behavior nor re ‡ect the interest of only one type of agent; rather, they are the result of the incentives of each of the two asymmetric types of agents that participate in the formation of a link. Then, the following questions arise:
(i) What are the incentives of manufacturers and retailers to link? What is the architecture of "stable" networks of distribution when both manufacturers and retailers decide the bilateral links they want to establish among them? 2 have studied the formation of research and development networks and collusive alliances among corporations. Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) have developed the …rst model of network formation where links are used to share risk when formal insurance mechanisms are not available. Page and Wooders (2007) have analyzed the formation of clubs as a network formation game. Jackson (2003 Jackson ( , 2005 provides surveys of models of network formation. 3 In a setting with two manufacturers and only one retailer, O'Brien and Sha¤er (1997) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998) have shown that vertical foreclosure is not an equilibrium. 4 An exclusive dealing agreement is a restriction of the retailer's behavior under which the retailer agrees not to buy from any other manufacturer. Similarly, an exclusive distribution agreement is a manufacturer's behavior restriction under which the manufacturer agrees not to sell to any other retailer. Lin (1990) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1993) have shown that exclusive dealership rather than common dealership is chosen to dampen competition between the manufacturers.
(ii) Are individual incentives to link adequate from a social welfare point of view?
In order to answer these questions we develop a benchmark model, which consists of a three-stage game played by manufacturers and retailers. Each manufacturer produces a di¤erentiated product (brand) which is sold to one or several retailers at a constant per unit price and retailers can be multiproduct sellers. In the …rst stage, the manufacturers and the retailers decide about the bilateral relationships (or links) they want to establish among them. A link between a manufacturer and a retailer is necessary in order to sell the manufacturer's brand to consumers. The cost of a link is shared equally between the manufacturer and the retailer. The collection of pairwise links between manufacturers and retailers de…nes a distribution network. In the second stage, manufacturers choose simultaneously the transfer prices of their products to retailers. In the third stage, retailers compete simultaneously in quantities .
In order to solve the model we obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium for the two …nal stages and, for the initial stage, we obtain the set of "stable" distribution networks.
A simple way to analyze the networks that are expected to emerge in the long run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not bene…t from altering the structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability notion de…ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . A network is pairwise stable if no agent bene…ts from severing one of their links and no other two agents bene…t from adding a link between them, with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly. We o¤er some general results for the case of n manufacturers and n retailers, and then characterize the set of stable networks for n = 2: The analysis of whether networks that involve exclusivities emerge is done for the case of linear contracts and two-part tari¤ contracts. The benchmark case concentrates on linear contracts which have several advantages and are present in a number of industries. 5 Two-part tari¤ contracts (retailers pay both a transfer price and an up-front …xed fee to a manufacturer) are used in several industries and deserve particular attention due to their strategic value for manufacturers. Further, in order to check for the robustness of our …ndings, we extend our analysis in two directions: no bargaining power upstream and di¤erentiated retailers with price competition.
Depending on the particular distribution network, three kinds of rivalry may be eventually at play: interbrand rivalry, intrabrand rivalry and in-store rivalry. corresponds to the rivalry among manufacturers'di¤erentiated products and is more intense the lower the degree of product di¤erentiation. The second is the rivalry in the same product sold by di¤erent retailers, and the third one is a special kind of interbrand rivalry since it appears when one retailer sells several products. Therefore, the distribution network that will emerge is the result of the interplay of these three rivalry types for each of the asymmetric agents. In particular, the addition of one link to the network has in general three e¤ects on the agents' pro…ts. One negative and common to both groups of agents, which is independent of the network considered, the link cost e¤ ect associated to the implementation of one link. There are two further e¤ects, an output expansion e¤ ect and a competition e¤ ect, which depend on the rivalry types. These rivalry types a¤ect each of the agents in a di¤erent way and enter di¤erently depending on the initial network to which a new link is added. For example, consider the networks that can be formed between one manufacturer and the n retailers. We prove that, the manufacturer always has an incentive to form links with all the n retailers available provided the other manufacturers do not form any links (Result 1). In other words, the introduction of intrabrand rivalry is always pro…table if it is the unique type of rivalry present in the market.
The reason is that for the manufacturer, the positive output expansion e¤ect from a new link o¤sets both the negative competition and the link cost e¤ects. The output expansion e¤ect is positive since a new strand of pro…ts is associated with each additional link;
while the competition e¤ect is negative from the second link onwards, since a new link implies a reduction in the pro…ts that come from existing links. For retailers there is no competition e¤ect, since in this particular case they only sell one product and therefore they are always willing to form a link. In general, agents always have an incentive to form a link when it only comprises an output expansion e¤ect and a cost e¤ect. We also …nd that a retailer always has an incentive to form links with the n manufacturers, provided the other retailers do not. This means that the introduction of in-store rivalry, when it is the unique rivalry type in the market, is always pro…table for the common retailer. The positive output expansion e¤ect for the common retailer o¤sets both the competition and link cost e¤ects. Finally, it is important to highlight that the size and sign of these e¤ects might be a¤ected by the type of contract linking manufacturers and retailers. In particular, Result 1 is no longer true for two-part tari¤ contracts since the output expansion and the competition e¤ects for the manufacturer are both null. By use of the terms of the contract the manufacturer is able to replicate in the market the integrated monopolist outcome regardless of the number of retailers used. Since the link cost e¤ect is negative, the network with one link is the only stable network.
For the case n = 2, there are …fteen possible network architectures, which, given the symmetry of products and retailers, reduce to six qualitatively di¤erent distribution networks (see Figure 1) . We …nd that, for either type of contract, three distribution networks are pairwise stable for particular values of the degree of product di¤erentiation and link costs. These are network C, non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing where the three types of rivalry are present in the market in a symmetric way; network ED, exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing, where there is only interbrand rivalry in the market; and network X, the mixed distribution system. 6 However, the parameter regions for which these networks are stable are sensitive to the contract type. For example, network C is stable when brands are rather di¤erentiated in the benchmark case, while it is stable when brands are weakly di¤erentiated in the two-part tari¤ case. The opposite happens for network ED. The reason is that when products are rather similar, the …rms are inclined to form a distribution network that relaxes competition upstream. By the e¤ect of the terms of the contract, network C is the most competitive network (lowest transfer prices and largest output of all the networks) in the benchmark case while network ED entails the lowest transfer prices in the two part tari¤ case.
The use of two-part tari¤ contracts is a modi…cation of the manufacturers'exercise of power, since they reinforce manufacturers'control on retailers with respect to the bench- 6 We are also able to show that networks C and ED are pairwise stable for n > 2 in the benchmark case. The former is stable for small link costs regardless of the degree of product di¤erentiation, the latter for large link costs and not too di¤erentiated products. mark case. At the other extreme, consider the case where manufacturers do not have any bargaining power so that transfer prices are set equal to manufacturers' marginal cost under any possible distribution network. We …nd that, in addition to networks C and ED; network H is also pairwise stable: The reason for the stability of H rather than X is that now the introduction of interbrand rivalry (the move from H to X) is now less pro…table (as it supposes a large negative competition e¤ect) for a retailer because there is no improvement in the retailer's margin given the constant transfer price. Thus, network H might be stable now.
We …nally complete the robustness of the benchmark case by analyzing the case of di¤erentiated retailers who compete in prices. The fact that retailers'strategic variables are now strategic complements implies more output at equilibrium, but it does not a¤ect the set of pairwise stable networks already found in the benchmark case, ED, X, and C. The reason is that retailers bene…t from lower transfer prices and equilibrium outputs increase when introducing intrabrand rivalry (moving from ED to X and then to C).
However, for the manufacturers involved there appears a trade o¤ since lower manufacturer margins are balanced by larger equilibrium outputs.
One wonders whether the set of stable distribution networks obtained by the strategic interaction of sel…sh agents coincides with the set of consumer and/or social welfare maximizing networks. We …nd that this is not the case and, consequently, a rationale for intervention arises. From the consumers view point, as they do not bear the link costs, they prefer the highest level of output in the market regardless of the number of links.
Therefore, for the benchmark case, consumers preferred network is C where the three types of rivalry are present. However, for the two-part tari¤ case, consumers prefer network ED.
From a social welfare perspective we …nd that, in the benchmark case, when link costs are small enough, two distribution networks may maximize social welfare: C and X. The former when the degree of product di¤erentiation is high enough; the latter, otherwise.
When link costs become large, network ED maximizes welfare for a high enough degree of product di¤erentiation; the exclusive distribution & non-exclusive dealing, denoted by M R, otherwise. Thus, a con ‡ict between stability and social welfare is likely to occur, regardless of the degree of product di¤erentiation. Similarly, for the two-part tari¤ case, we …nd that there is no coincidence between the social interest and the stable networks.
However, now the discrepancy is greater as compared with the benchmark case. There is one stable network, C, which is never welfare maximizing, and there is one, H 1 , that maximizes social welfare which is never stable. 
The model
We develop a three-stage game to study the formation of networks among two asymmetric groups of agents (manufacturers and retailers) in a successive oligopoly. In order to sell the manufacturer's brand to consumers, manufacturers and retailers must form a product distribution network consisting of di¤erent bilateral relationships (or links) between them.
In an initial stage, manufacturers and retailers decide on the links they want to establish.
In the second stage, once the distribution network has been formed, manufacturers decide simultaneously the terms of the contracts o¤ered to retailers. Finally, retailers decide simultaneously the quantity of each brand they are going to sell in the market.
There are n manufacturers, M i (i = 1; 2; :::; n), producing each its own branded product i under constant returns to scale and incurring a common unit cost c. There are n retailers, R j (j = 1; 2; :::; n), which might be supplied by manufacturers and sell the goods to consumers. The terms of payment for retailers will initially consist of a constant unit price per unit bought, the transfer price (usually named as linear contracts). If two-part tari¤ contracts are considered then the terms of payment include a transfer price and an up-front …xed fee. Let w i and F i denote the transfer price and the up-front …xed fee set by manufacturer i for supplying its brand. Retailers may be multi-product as they are allowed to carry several products and are assumed undi¤erentiated. However, we will later consider the case of a successive duopoly where retailers are di¤erentiated and compete in prices. The retailing costs borned by the retailers are assumed to be zero. We de…ne as the benchmark model the case of linear contracts, undi¤erentiated retailers and quantity competition among retailers.
A distribution network cannot be enforced. We assume that joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a link between a manufacturer and a retailer. The cost of a link for each agent is denoted by k 0. 7 In a distribution network, manufacturers and retailers are the nodes in the graph and links indicate di¤erent bilateral relationships between the agents. Then, a distribution network g is simply a list of which pair of manufacturers and retailers are linked to each other. We denote by N n = fM 1 ; M 2 ; :::; M n ; R 1 ; R 2 ; :::; R n g the set of agents which might be connected in a distribution network. Consider the pair formed by manufacturer i and retailer j, with M i ; R j 2 N n . Then (i; j) 2 g indicates that 7 We assume that the costs of links are constant and shared equally by both parties in the interest of tractability. Indeed, these costs capture the fact that there should be a permanent relationship among the manufacturer and the retailer and this is costly.
i and j are linked under the network g. The network obtained by adding link (i; j) to an existing network g is denoted by g +(i;j) and the network obtained by deleting link (i; j)
from an existing network g is denoted by g (i;j) .
Let G n be the set of all possible distribution networks when n manufacturers and n retailers might be connected. It is then clear that each distribution network g 2 G n determines a particular market con…guration with the following features. For any given g; we denote by m n the number of manufacturers with at least one link in g and by n r i the number of retailers selling brand i: Similarly, we denote by r n the number of retailers with at least one link in g and by n b j the number of brands sold by retailer j. To sum up there are m brands competing through a retail oligopoly of r …rms, some of the retailers possibly being multi-product sellers.
Let q ij be the quantity of brand i that retailer j sells to consumers and let Q i = P nr i j=1 q ij denote the total amount of brand i produced by M i and sold by the retailers linked with it. The system of inverse demand functions is de…ned by Retailer j's and manufacturer i's pro…ts for the case of linear contracts are,
:::; r;
For convenience we also denote by R j and M i the corresponding pro…ts gross of any link costs. Each distribution network combines the above mentioned types of rivalry in a particular way. Therefore, …nding the networks that will emerge in the long run amounts to …nding how the di¤erent types of rivalry endogenously arise. There are several distribution networks that we speci…cally consider since they are fully symmetric, in the sense that each agent in its group (manufacturers or retailers) is symmetric in the network and imply interesting combinations of rivalry types. The …rst one is the complete network, C; where the n manufacturers have a link with each of the n retailers (for all i; j; n b j = n r i = r = m = n) and therefore, no further link is permitted. In such a network the three rivalry types are present symmetrically. The exclusive distribution and dealing network, ED, where each manufacturer has only one and exclusive retailer, each retailer sells exclusively one brand and there is neither intrabrand nor in-store rivalry (for all i; j; n b j = n r i = 1, and r = m = n). The homogeneous oligopoly network, H r , where only one manufacturer is linked with r n retailers (we keep notation H when r = n), A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not bene…t from altering the structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability notion de…ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . A network is pairwise stable if no agent bene…ts from severing one of their links and no other two agents bene…t from adding a link between them, with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly. This de…nition of stability is quite weak and should be seen as a necessary condition for strategic stability. 8 De…nition 1 A network g is pairwise stable if
, and
When one …rm forms a new link three di¤erent e¤ects might arise that a¤ect …rms's pro…ts. First, there is an output expansion e¤ ect since either an additional brand is sold by a retailer or an additional distribution channel is open for a manufacturer. This e¤ect is non negative and accounts for the pro…ts directly generated by the new link. A second e¤ect, the competition e¤ ect, shows up when the …rm considered was already selling another brand or distributing through another distribution channel. This e¤ect is thus 8 Pairwise stability only considers deviations on a single link at a time. For instance, it could be that an agent would not bene…t from severing any single link but would bene…t from severing several links simultaneously, and yet the network would still be pairwise stable. Players cannot be farsighted in the sense that the variation in pro…ts coming from the existing links when a new link is introduced. It is usually negative since more competition is introduced, the magnitude of which depends on the initial and the new network architectures when one link is added. Finally, a third e¤ect is a pure cost e¤ ect, the per …rm link cost, and is negative. Therefore, the incentives to form a link are clearly de…ned. A new link will be added if both a manufacturer and a retailer realize an overall positive e¤ect, that is, when the output expansion e¤ect o¤sets the other two. It is important to note that the …rst two e¤ects depend on the degree of product di¤erentiation, on the initial distribution network to which the new link is added and on the resulting network and di¤er by the type of agent considered. The third e¤ect is independent of the network and type of agent. If an existing link is severed then the above mentioned e¤ects work in the opposite direction. In order to be pro…table to cut a link, the …rm's savings due to the cost e¤ect must be greater than the combined e¤ect of softer competition and one less stream of pro…ts. To make comparisons possible we will de…ne an upper bound on the link cost k, which depends on the number of possible manufacturers or retailers, n. The bound is k n minf R j =n b j ; M i =n r i g for all possible
i; j linked in all possible g 2 G n . This is so to guarantee that all agents get nonnegative equilibrium pro…ts in each of the possible distribution network.
Some general results
To illustrate how the above e¤ects work, take …rst the case where there is only intrabrand rivalry. Consider the H (n 1) distribution network where M 1 is linked will all the retailers except one. To add a new link between M 1 and the remaining retailer both …rms must agree. The isolated retailer will always agree since there is no competition e¤ect and the output expansion e¤ect outweights the cost e¤ect. This is a general result that can be stated as follows: any isolated …rm is always willing to form a link since the output expansion e¤ ect always o¤ sets the cost e¤ ect. However, for M 1 , we need to compute and compare the three e¤ects. The output expansion e¤ect is the amount of pro…ts that comes from the new distribution channel. The competition e¤ect is computed as the variation (reduction) in pro…ts that accrue from the (n 1) distribution channels by the e¤ect of the new link. Both the output and the competition e¤ects are decreasing in n. The di¤erence between the output and the competition e¤ects is greater than R j (H) that, by assumption, is also greater than any link costs k k n . Thus, the following result is proven. 9 Result 1 If there are n retailers available, then all the distribution networks H j for j = 9 All the equilibrium expressions for the general networks and all the proofs are available from the authors upon request.
1; :::; (n 1) are not pairwise stable. There is always an incentive to form a link between the manufacturer and an isolated retailer.
Similarly, we can prove that the exclusive dealing and distribution con…guration where all except one of the manufacturer-retailer pairs are linked is not pairwise stable since the remaining pair has always an incentive to link. Note that there is no competition e¤ect and the output expansion e¤ect is always greater than or equal to any link costs k k n .
In general, if the competition e¤ect is null and there is a pair manufacturer-retailer which is not linked then a new link among them will be formed.
Result 2 Any g 2 G n which includes at least one isolated manufacturer and one isolated retailer is not pairwise stable.
Finally, we discuss how the three e¤ects work when there is both interbrand and instore rivalry but not intrabrand, that is we analyze M R n 1 . Recall that in this situation the not linked manufacturer, say M i , has an incentive to link with the multiproduct retailer since the competition e¤ect is null and M i (M R) k n . However, the new link must also be pro…table to the multiproduct monopolist retailer, say R 1 . The output expansion e¤ect is equal to the pro…ts that R 1 obtains from selling the brand of the previously not linked manufacturer when n brands are sold in M R. The competition e¤ect is computed as the variation in R 1 's pro…ts that accrue from the (n 1) brands by the e¤ect of the new link.
We have proved that for n = 2 the competition e¤ect is positive since the multiproduct retailer is able to internalize the competition by the new brand sold due to the lower transfer price from the previously linked manufacturer. For n = 3, the new brand added imposes tougher competition to the existing two and the better terms of payment can compensate for it only when the interbrand rivalry is no too intense: For n 4, the new brand imposes still tougher competition that cannot be compensated by better terms of payment from manufacturers and therefore the competition e¤ect is negative. We prove that the positive output expansion e¤ect o¤sets both the competition and the cost e¤ect for all n. Therefore, the next result holds.
Result 3
If there are n manufacturers available, then all the distribution networks M R i for i = 1; :::; (n 1) are not pairwise stable. There is always an incentive to form a link between the retailer and an isolated manufacturer.
The case 2 2
To completely characterize the set of pairwise stable networks we next turn to the case of two manufacturers and two retailers. In such a case there are only six qualitatively di¤erent distribution networks. Five already de…ned: H 1 , H, M R, ED and C. The remaining one is an asymmetric distribution network, which will be denoted by X standing for mixed distribution networks, formed from severing a link in the complete network or adding a link to either ED or M R or H (see Figure 1 ). For the asymmetric network, X, take the equilibrium expressions in C (1;1) . Further to check for pairwise stability we specify the upper bound for the cost e¤ect in the following result. The upper bound k 2 , is equal to seller. The internalization of in-store rivalry results in lower output from the former brand but also a lower transfer price and this is to be added to the new stream of pro…ts from the additional brand. The result is that the output expansion e¤ect is large enough to compensate for the negative but relatively small competition e¤ect and for the cost e¤ect.
Similarly, there always exists a manufacturer willing to link with the isolated retailer in M R, since by introducing intrabrand rivalry its transfer price is reduced at equilibrium to increase its aggregate equilibrium output at the expense of a reduction in the rival's equilibrium output that more than compensates the lower margin and the extra link cost.
The following proposition summarizes (and Figure 2 depicts the regions) the networks of manufacturers and retailers that are pairwise stable for n = 2.
Proposition 1 Consider n = 2. Then only three distribution networks may be pairwise stable: C, X and ED. The parameter space (k; d) is partitioned into four regions.
(i) Low values of d and k imply that C is the only pairwise stable network. In general, for n 2, the only pairwise deviation from network C consists in deleting one link moving to C (i;j) . Therefore, C is pairwise stable as long as the link cost is small enough. Consider the link between R 1 and M 1 , then R 1 does not sever the link if and (1;1) ), and M 1 does not sever the link if and only if (1;1) ). First, when the manufacturer deletes one of its distribution channels, a negative output expansion e¤ect is produced (which is smaller the higher d is) and M 1 's derived demand function changes from Q 1 (C) to Q 1 (C (1;1) ). The latter is less sensitive to changes in M 1 's transfer price which implies a less elastic derived demand. Then, M 1 's equilibrium transfer price increases, which amounts to a positive competition e¤ect, whose size is decreasing with d. In fact, in the move from C to C (1;1) all transfer prices increase and the one that increases the most is that of M 1 . Finally, the trade o¤ between a lower demand but a higher transfer price results in a decrease in M 1 gross payo¤s. This decrease is lower the lower the degree of product di¤erentiation. In the case of n = 2, see Figure 2 , we …nd that when brands are slightly di¤erentiated the deletion of a link increases gross pro…ts since the competition e¤ect outweights the output expansion e¤ect, C M < 0, making C not stable for k = 0. Note that when n = 2, if one manufacturer deletes a link this means that intrabrand rivalry in its brand is eliminated. However, for n > 2 this never occurs.
For R 1 the intuition is simpler since it reduces the number of streams of revenue by not selling product one (negative output expansion e¤ect), sells more output and obtains a lower margin for all the other products it sells since the move from C to C (1;1) results in softer competition upstream. Overall, the stability of the complete network depends on the amount saved with one link less (cost e¤ect) with respect to the decrease in gross payo¤s for M 1 and R 1 (output plus competition e¤ect). We …nd that for n > 2, network C is stable for small k for all possible d. The required level of k to ensure the stability of network C is decreasing in d. Thus, Proposition 1's result on the stability of network C is basically robust for n > 2. 11 Concerning ED, it is clear by Result 2 that none of the manufacturer-retailer pairs will severe a link. Thus, regardless the number of agents of each type, network ED is pairwise stable when at least one …rm is not better o¤ with one more link (the move from ED to ED +(i;j) ). Consider R 2 and M 1 , then R 2 will not form a link with M 1 if and only if k > ED R = R 2 (ED +(1;2) ) R 2 (ED), whereas M 1 will not if and only if
Thus, network ED is pairwise stable if and only if k > minf ED R , ED M g. See Figure 2 for the regions where network ED is pairwise stable for n = 2. The analysis of network ED stability requires some more elaboration. First notice that intrabrand rivalry is introduced in only one of the products and that one of 1 1 We know that both the retailers becomes a multiproduct seller while the others remain as exclusive retailers.
Second, the addition of a link a¤ects the derived demand functions for manufacturers in an asymmetric way. Thus, when manufacturers compete in setting transfer prices there will be three di¤erent equilibrium transfer prices in network ED + (1;2) . Indeed, the introduction of one link implies that the three di¤erent derived demands are now more elastic. Consequently, M 1 reduces its equilibrium transfer price (with respect to that in ED), M 2 reacts to face the introduction of intrabrand competition in its former exclusive retailer by reducing its transfer price in a larger amount than M 1 . The remaining manufacturers also react by reducing their transfer prices but in a less important way. As a result, R 2 is getting a positive output expansion e¤ect and a small negative competition e¤ect since it gets a greater margin than in ED for product two due to the introduction of intrabrand competition in product one. We …nd that R 2 is always willing to form a new Finally, for d > d 2 the network is stable for all k. We conclude that network ED is stable for large d regardless of k or for large k. Thus, Proposition 1's result on the stability of network ED regarding large enough d is basically robust for n > 2.
Finally, note that when n = 2, distribution networks C (1;1) , ED +(1;2) and X are qualitatively the same. Therefore and since M R is never pairwise stable, X is pairwise stable when both C and ED are not stable. That is, for intermediate levels of the link Figure 2 . Assume now that there are three retailers and two manufacturers and consider the EDlike network with each of the manufacturers linked with only one retailer and one isolated retailer. It is interesting to ask whether the manufacturers prefer to introduce intrabrand rivalry through the isolated retailer or through an already linked retailer. Transfer prices fall but the fall is smaller when using the isolated retailer. It can be shown that by linking with the isolated retailer, the output expansion e¤ect always o¤sets the competition e¤ect for the manufacturers, thus implying that the ED-like network is unstable if there are no link costs. Therefore, the manufacturers are always willing to increase the number of exclusive retailers to which they are linked.
Two-part tari¤ analysis
This section examines the case of two-part tari¤ contracts between manufacturers and retailers. The terms of payment for the retailer are de…ned by the pair fw; F g where w is the transfer price and F is the up-front …xed fee. Firm's pro…ts for a generic network g with r n retailers active and m n brands in the market are
F ij for all j = 1; :::; r and
F ij for all i = 1; 2; :::m, where the superscript t denotes the two part tari¤ case. A contract with two instruments strengthens manufacturers power upon retailers. It is well known that, in a successive monopoly (i.e. H 1 ), the use of two part tari¤s allows the manufacturer to dictate the integrated monopoly output, then obtaining the integrated monopoly pro…ts and leaving the retailer with zero pro…ts. This drives the market to a more e¢ cient outcome as compared to the linear contracts case. However, the ability of these two instruments to extract pro…ts and to reach a more e¢ cient outcome is limited under other market situations. For example, if the retailer is a multiproduct seller it is no longer true that the manufacturer is able to extract all the retailers'pro…ts with a two-part tari¤ contract.
The e¤ects governing the incentives to form a link are a¤ected by this new power balance in the manufacturer-retailer relationship.
In the last stage of the game, links, transfer prices and …xed fees are given. The unique Nash equilibrium of this stage game coincides with the corresponding one in the benchmark model. In other words, the derived demands for manufacturers do not di¤er in both cases. In the second stage, manufacturers decide simultaneously the transfer prices and the …xed fees such that retailers accept. Manufacturers pro…ts are increasing in the fees whereas retailers pro…ts are decreasing, therefore the fee charged to a retailer is set to the point that the retailer accepts. Two situations are distinguished. First, if a retailer is a single-product seller then the up-front …xed fee is set by the manufacturer such that the retailer gets zero pro…ts: a fully extracting fee. Second, if a retailer is a multiproduct seller the most that manufacturer i will extract from retailer j is an up-front …xed fee set equal to product i's marginal contribution to the retailer's j pro…ts (see Sha¤er, 1991, and O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1993). 12 Multiproduct retailers can threat manufacturer i with selling zero of product i since the retailer can compensate for by selling more of the other substitute products. Retailers' ability to threat manufacturers vanishes when products are independent. Once …xed fees are de…ned, their expressions are substituted back in the manufacturers'pro…ts and the …rst derivative with respect to the transfer price is obtained to compute the …rst order condition. In contrast with the linear contract case, a third term appears accounting for the marginal e¤ect of the transfer price on the corresponding fee. Let us consider the n = 2 case. In particular, for network C we have:
The third term di¤ers across networks and determines whether the equilibrium transfer price is above or below marginal cost. It is easy to prove that for network C, where the …xed fee is not fully extracting, thus implying that the manufacturer trades o¤ a higher transfer price for a lower fee. Finally, the FOC can be simpli…ed to @ t network ED, where the …xed fee is fully extracting, we have:
It then follows that equilibrium transfer prices are now set below marginal costs. Note that when the …xed fee is fully extracting, the manufacturer pays for the whole cost of the link, 2k. In other words, since t
As before de…ne by convenience t R j (ED) as R 0 j s pro…ts gross of link costs given network ED and under the two-part tari¤ contract.
As previously done in the benchmark case we …rst obtain the upper bound for the link cost, k t 2 , i.e. the set of link costs ensuring that agents'pro…ts in all possible distribution networks are positive. 13 The upper bound k t 2 is set equal to min
The following proposition summarizes pairwise stability among distribution networks and Figure 3 displays the regions in the (k; d) space where each distribution network is pairwise stable. 1 2 In order to illustrate how fees are computed, consider for example network C and the case of …xed fee Fij. The contract set by Mi is accepted by Rj if:
is greater than or equal to the pro…ts Rj can obtain by threating Mi with dropping product i. That is, max q lj (p l w l )q lj F lj 2k; l 6 = i subject to qij = 0. 1 3 We have k
and k Another consequence of two-part tari¤ contracts is that the output expansion e¤ect for manufacturers could be nil and the same may happen for the competition e¤ect. With this in mind, note that Result 1 is no longer true since now there is no incentive for the linked manufacturer in H n 1 to form a link with a not linked retailer. Then, H is not pairwise stable because the linked manufacturer gets the same gross pro…ts in both networks H and H n 1 whereas it pays 2k more (the total cost of the new link). In any network H r , r 6 = 1, the manufacturer is able to set a transfer price that induces the monopoly output in the retail market ( since there is no interbrand rivalry) and through the …xed fees getting the same gross pro…ts as in H 1 . There is no increase in the manufacturer's pro…ts by adding a new distribution channel, a null output expansion e¤ect. Retailers are always indi¤erent since they always get zero. Thus no network H r , r 6 = 1, is pairwise stable. Moreover, H 1
is not pairwise stable because Result 2 applies and ED will be formed. In network H 1 there is a manufacturer and a retailer not linked and, although the retailer is indi¤erent, the manufacturer always obtains positive pro…ts in ED. Finally, Result 3 also holds here since from M R 1 to M R when n = 2, the linked retailer becomes multiproduct and then obtains positive pro…ts. 14 The only pairwise deviation from network C consists in deleting one link. Note that neither retailer has an interest to do it, since this implies that it becomes a single-product seller and then the corresponding manufacturer is able to set a fully extracting fee thus achieving zero payo¤s. Regarding manufacturers, no manufacturer wants to sever a link if and only if
, where i is the manufacturer that deletes a link and t C M is the increment in gross pro…ts for M i when C is formed from X. Pairwise stability requires that the combination of the output and competition e¤ect o¤sets the cost e¤ect. By severing a link, M i only sells its product throughout a multiproduct retailer and sets a transfer price that equals its marginal cost. As already noted, the increase in w i has three e¤ects: increases the revenue from the output sold, reduces the output sold and reduces the …xed fee. By moving from C to X the second e¤ect is weak and the third one strong. Therefore the manufacturer is better o¤ reducing its transfer price to the point that all its income is obtained from the …xed fee. By strategic complementarity the other manufacturer also reduces its equilibrium transfer price, resulting in more output for both products and a more competitive situation in the market. It is pro…table for M i to sever a link if the saving in link costs o¤sets the decrease in gross pro…ts explained by the combined output expansion and competition e¤ect. It is important to remark that, in this case, the e¤ect of severing a link is a negative output expansion e¤ect and a positive competition e¤ect.
Consider the stability of network ED. It happens that ED is pairwise stable if and only if no agent wants to form a link since, by Result 2 above, no one will sever an existing link. A retailer always wants to form a new link since it gets positive payo¤s by becoming a multi-product seller. However, a manufacturer prefers not to form a link if the link cost is su¢ ciently large,
(ED). By forming a link the manufacturer distributes its product both through a single-product and a multiproduct retailer. Then its link cost only increases in k, its derived demand becomes more sensitive to changes in w i and the sum of the fees is less sensitive to changes in w i . The result is that now manufacturer i's transfer price increases (it is above marginal cost) and the rival's increases too (now it equals marginal costs). The combined e¤ect on product's i total output of a less competitive situation in terms of transfer prices together with the introduction of both intrabrand and in-store rivalry is not uniform and depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation. Product i's equilibrium output is greater in network Finally note that network X is pairwise stable so long as the manufacturer selling to both retailers prefers not to break the link with the multi-product retailer, (which happens for k < t ED M ) and also when the manufacturer selling to one retailer prefers not to form a new link with the single product retailer, which happens for k > t C M . The remaining option, the manufacturer selling to both retailers severing the link with the single product retailer is never pro…table for the manufacturer since the required saving in link cost would be so large that it would exceed k t . This is the reason why M R is not pairwise stable either. By severing a link with a single-product retailer it eliminates intrabrand rivalry but, given the type of contract, both equilibrium transfer prices decrease down to marginal costs and, at the same time, output decreases. This together with the fact that the manufacturer that deletes the link loses all the single-product retailer's pro…ts that are fully extracted via the fee explains the instability of network M R.
Robustness analysis
We wish to extend the main intuitions of the benchmark model by providing alternative model speci…cations in two directions. The …rst one is related with the exogenous advantage given to the upstream …rms in setting …rst the transfer price. We consider the simplest situation where upstream …rm has no bargaining power that is equivalent to the case where both di¤erentiated products are produced by competitive industries. In this case, the transfer price is just the marginal cost of production and the double marginalization ine¢ ciency is eliminated. Secondly, both retailer di¤erentiation and price competition in the retail industry are considered.
No bargaining power upstream
We assume that in this situation both products have the same transfer price which equals marginal cost of production and that retailers pay the full cost of a new link. The third stage of the benchmark model is replicated for each possible distribution network and equilibrium quantities are easily obtained by setting w 1 = w 2 = c: Manufacturers obtain zero pro…ts. We denote by r R j (g) and by r R j (g) the R j 's equilibrium pro…ts and equilibrium gross pro…ts, respectively, for network g. We then obtain the relevant set for the link costs, that is, 0 k k r 2 (a c) 2 18(1+d) and then …nd the stable distribution networks. The following proposition summarizes pairwise stability among distribution networks and Figure 4 displays the corresponding areas in the relevant parameter space. 15 Proposition 3 Only three distribution networks might be pairwise stable: C, H and ED.
The stability of each one is associated with a particular combination of the two parameters 
(ii) Intermediate values of k and all values of d imply that both C and ED are pairwise stable network. Note that since manufacturers now play a passive role, only the retailers' incentives to form links need consideration. Regarding the results stated in the benchmark case, it easily follows that Results 1 and 2 remain valid. However, Result 3 is not always true, either of the two networks M R 1 or M R might be preferred by the multi-product retailer depending on the particular values of link cost and product di¤erentiation. This is explained because now the move from M R 1 to M R does not bene…t the multiproduct retailer with a reduction in the transfer price of the formerly linked manufacturer since transfer prices are not strategic. However, M R 1 is not pairwise stable once we apply Result 2. Also M R is not pairwise stable because the isolated retailer has always incentives to form a link with one manufacturer. The stability of network C requires k < r C R , being R j the retailer that deletes a link. As in the benchmark case, by severing a link the retailer enjoys a positive cost e¤ect, it gets a negative output expansion e¤ect and a positive competition e¤ect. The main di¤erence is that it saves 2k instead and that the competition e¤ect is greater since transfer prices are not strategic. The fact that transfer prices are not strategic is thus the main force underlying the results in this case and can be applied to justify why network H is now stable under particular conditions. If the transfer prices were strategic as in the benchmark case, then there would always be a retailer in H willing to link with the isolated manufacturer and introduce interbrand rivalry in the market. Now the introduction of interbrand rivalry does not have the e¤ect of lowering transfer prices and therefore, the competition e¤ect is stronger thus making the stability of network H possible: The same argument applies to sustain that the stability of network ED is reinforced against the possibility of forming a new link and moving to network X.
Therefore, the general claim in this case is that the e¤ect of allocating all bargaining power on the retailers side implies that the introduction of interbrand rivalry (moving from H to X) or the introduction of intrabrand rivalry (moving from ED to X) is less likely to happen since the associated competition e¤ects are stronger than in the benchmark case.
Finally note that if the link cost e¤ect is zero, then network C will be the unique pairwise stable network since the output expansion e¤ect always dominates the competition e¤ect.
Di¤erentiated retailers
In the benchmark model, retailers were not di¤erentiated and the same product sold by di¤erent retailers was perceived as identical by consumers implying maximal intrabrand rivalry. In that case, and assuming that retailers compete in prices, intrabrand rivalry yields zero pro…ts in this brand to retailers by standard Bertrand competition type of arguments. In this section we are going to provide some results about pairwise stability when retailers are di¤erentiated at the eyes of consumers and there is price competition.
We will assume that intrabrand rivalry increases as parameter s increases for s 2 (0; 1).
Also, to simplify the analysis, we will assume zero link costs and n = 2. To be as close as possible to the benchmark model, we will start with the inverse demand system already employed that incorporates the new feature of retailers di¤erentiation as follows: 16 p ii = a q ii sq ij dq ji sdq jj for i; j = 1; 2.
The …rst subscript denotes the product and the second subscript the retailer. Since there are two di¤erentiated products and two di¤erentiated retailers, the four di¤erent products a¤ect the price of product i sold by retailer i in four ways. The own e¤ect is as in the benchmark case. Next, s is the parameter that incorporates the degree of intrabrand rivalry in the market since it is the e¤ect of product i sold by retailer j. Also, d is the parameter that incorporates the degree of interbrand rivalry in the market, the e¤ect of the other product sold by the same retailer. Finally, we assume that the e¤ect of the other product sold by the other retailer is the product of the two already mentioned parameters, sd. Notice that the inverse demand given above depends on the speci…c distribution network considered. For instance, the system of demand functions obtained by inverting the system of inverse demands in network C is: q ii = ((1 s)(1 d)a p ii + sp ij + dp ji sdp jj )=((1 d 2 )(1 s 2 )), i; j = 1; 2. However, for network ED, the demand system is 2 d 2 ) ), i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j.
Note that price competition in the third stage implies in this context that retailers' decisions are strategic complements. In general this will lead to greater output at equilibrium when compared to a situation with quantity competition. For example if there is only intrabrand rivalry in one of the products, network H, the manufacturer monopolist is setting the monopoly transfer price no matter the nature of competition at the retail level. Also, the equilibrium level of product 1 is greater when retailers compete in prices.
The manufacturer is better o¤ with price competition while retailers are better o¤ with quantity competition. The same conclusions apply for the case of network C: greater output and the same transfer prices in case of price competition. Thus, manufacturers prefer price competition whereas retailers prefer quantity competition. Regarding pairwise stability we prove the next two results.
Result 4 Networks M R, H and H 1 are not pairwise stable when retailers are di¤ erentiated and compete in prices.
The reason is simple for network H 1 since the not linked manufacturer-retailer pair are always better o¤ forming a link. In case of network H; the relevant agent is a retailer, since either of the two has an incentive to link with the not linked manufacturer. This retailer is better o¤ with the new link since by introducing interbrand rivalry in the 1 6 We borrow the inverse demand system from Dobson and Waterson (1996) . market the equilibrium transfer prices are lower (w 1 (H) > w 1 (X) > w 2 (X) for M 1 being the one with two links in X) and the multiproduct retailer sells more of both products at equilibrium. In case of network M R, the relevant agent is a manufacturer. There is always a manufacturer with incentives to form a link with the not linked retailer to reach network X. By doing so, both equilibrium transfer prices increase (w 1 (X) > w 2 (X) > w 1 (M R)) and M 1 equilibrium output also increase q 11 (M R) < q 11 (X) + q 12 (X). First note that the retailers involved in the stability of ED, X and C are always better o¤ forming a link. The move from ED to X and then to C, allows retailers to bene…t from lower transfer prices (w 1 (ED) > w 1 (X) > w 2 (X) > w 1 (C)) and larger equilibrium outputs. However, for the manufacturers involved there is a trade o¤ between lower manufacturer margins and larger equilibrium outputs when moving from ED to X and then to C. It can be shown that network ED is stable when the increase in the equilibrium output by forming a link is not high enough (this happens when products are rather similar), while network C is stable when products are rather di¤erentiated because severing a link leads to an important decrease in the equilibrium outputs.
Proposition 4 Network

Welfare analysis
Some of the very central questions about network formation concern the conditions under which the networks which are formed by the players turn out to be e¢ cient from an overall societal perspective. We will distinguish two points of view. One concerns consumers as measured by consumer surplus and another concerns all agents together, total welfare. In this section we will concentrate on the case of n = 2. Consumer surplus in network g is denoted by CS(g) and is given by the following expression
The social welfare associated to network g is denoted by W (g) and is de…ned as the sum of the equilibrium pro…ts of the four …rms in network g plus the consumer surplus associated to g.
Consumer surplus and social welfare in the benchmark case
Depending on the particular distribution network, one or two products are present in the market. Di¤erent combinations of intrabrand, interbrand and in-store rivalry can be present. Which distribution network yields the highest consumer surplus? It is clear that consumers are better o¤ the higher the rivalry in the market since this implies the highest amount of output. Thus they prefer the three types of rivalry to be present in both products and retailers: that is network C. If this is not possible, the next preferred network is X, where there is in-store rivalry at one retailer and with the presence of both inter and intrabrand competition. Either network M R comes next for low enough product di¤erentiation or network H for intermediate levels of product di¤erentiation or network ED for su¢ ciently large product di¤erentiation levels: Note that only one retailer selling both products can be preferred to a homogeneous duopoly. The reason is that when M R is at play, the rivalry among manufacturers results in a lower equilibrium transfer price than in network H; despite the fact that in the latter the rivalry among retailers is stronger than in the former. The combination of both e¤ects explains why M R generates a higher consumer surplus than H when d is large enough, since transfer prices in M R are lower for large d. 17 Finally, the worst distribution network for consumer is the one with only one product in one retailer, H 1 . Then, consumer surplus is increasing with the introduction of di¤erent products by retailers.
Finally, we analyze the e¤ects of the di¤erent distribution networks on social welfare.
The distribution networks that attain the maximum social welfare are either ED or M R or X or C, depending on the degree of product di¤erentiation and the size of the link costs. Thus, only distribution networks that market both products can achieve the highest social welfare. That is, interbrand competition is always socially desirable in the market.
However, intrabrand competition and in-store competition are not necessarily socially desirable. we observe that the distribution networks that …rms will endogenously form following their own interest enter, in general, in contradiction with those that maximize welfare. Thus a sort of market failure is identi…ed that should call the attention of antitrust authorities.
For the particular case k = 0, we …nd that: (i) when C is stable it is the one that maximizes social welfare, but the reverse is not true; (ii) and that X maximizes social welfare when products are almost homogeneous but it is not stable. Once the formation of links is costly, networks ED and M R also maximize social welfare for some parameter 1 8 Expressions C X ; C ED ; C M R; X ED and X M R are de…ned as follows: for any two networks g1, g2 2 G2, g 1 g 2 is the level of k that solves
values. While ED could be stable when it maximizes social welfare, network M R is never stable when it maximizes welfare. Moreover, costly links increase the con ‡ict between social welfare and stability with respect to network C.
In general, there are distribution networks like C, M R and X that are less likely to arise when leaving the market forces on their own, as compared with the socially desirable outcome. By contrast, the distribution network ED appears to be stable under more situations than what would be socially desirable. We …nd that restricting exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing arrangements might have a positive impact on social welfare when the degree of product di¤erentiation is low enough.
Consumer surplus and social welfare in the two-part tari¤ case
As already established consumers prefer the network that will induce the highest level of output in both products. This of course depends crucially on the equilibrium transfer prices. With the use of two part tari¤ contracts, three types of situations are found at equilibrium regarding the sign of the manufacturers'margin. This margin is positive for all manufacturers in the distribution networks C and H; and for the manufacturer that employs two retailers, M 1 ; in X: It is zero in H 1 ; M R and for the manufacturer that employs one retailer, M 2 ; in X: Finally, in the distribution network ED both manufacturers have negative margins. This fact is crucial to understand which network maximizes consumer surplus and which attains the highest welfare. 19 Consumers are better o¤ in the distribution network in which competition at the manufacturers' level appears to be the toughest, that is, network ED. Network ED is the one where: a) both products are sold and then there is interbrand rivalry, b) the two retailers are active and are single-product and c) by the use of two-part tari¤s, there is a negative manufacturers' margin that induces a large amount of output at the retail level. It is important to underline that network ED yields more consumer surplus than C because, despite the existence of intrabrand rivalry in the latter, retailers' multiproduct nature implies that a smaller …xed fee in the two-part tari¤ contract is compensated by a higher transfer price thus reducing equilibrium output.
Finally and concerning welfare, the result is obtained as a combination of the consumer interest that advocates for ED and the maximization of the sum of the pro…ts of the four …rms which favors monopoly market con…gurations. It is easy to see that the distribution networks that end up in zero manufacturers' margin and that consist of a monopoly at the retailer level (networks H 1 and M R) are e¢ cient for the members of the network. In Figure 6 , 20 we see that social welfare is maximized either at ED, at H 1 or at X. and for any level of k; ED is the social maximizing network while for d = 1; it is H 1 :
It is important to underline that there is no coincidence between the social interest and the stable distribution networks. This is a result that already appeared in the benchmark case thus suggesting that the use of two-part tari¤ contracts does not solve the con ‡ict.
Comparing with the benchmark case notice that the trade o¤ between the number of links and the degree of product di¤erentiation is also present but involving networks that include fewer links. The reason is that the market is more competitive and more e¢ cient than in the benchmark model with less links. To compensate for the pro-e¢ ciency e¤ect of the two-part tari¤ contracts, in the benchmark case more links are required by the social maximizing networks. In particular, we have that the distribution network C is stable but never maximizing social welfare. The distribution network X is not maximizing social welfare when it is stable and, viceversa, is never stable when it maximizes welfare. Only the distribution network ED is sometimes both, the one that maximizes social welfare and the stable one. We …nd that restricting non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing networks might have a positive impact on social welfare when the degree of product di¤erentiation is low enough.
Conclusions
We have analyzed the endogenous formation of distribution systems adopting a network theory perspective, where the stability of a distribution link requires the joint consent of asymmetric groups of agents, i.e a manufacturer and a retailer. Both the non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing network (network C) and the exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing network (network ED) are found to be stable in the (n n) linear contract case and results are characterized by the interplay of rivalry types, which depend on the degree of product di¤erentiation, and link costs. We completely characterize the set of stable networks in the (2 2) case, which also includes the mixed distribution network (network X). However, the parameter region for which these particular networks are stable is sensitive to the contract type, as presented in Table 1 . Our robustness analysis examines the case of the manufacturers with no bargaining power and the case of di¤erentiated retailers who compete in prices. It has been shown that networks C and ED remain stable in both cases, and that network X is only stable under retailer di¤erentiation. In case that manufacturers have no bargaining power, the distribution network in which a unique manufacturer is linked with both retailers could also be pairwise stable.
Interestingly, there is a con ‡ict between stability and social welfare that arises under both types of contracts. Stable networks do not necessarily maximize consumer and/or social welfare, a fact that suggests a number of competition policy implications. Thus, we …nd that in industries where linear contracts are used, restricting exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing arrangements might have a positive impact on social welfare for a low degree of product di¤erentiation. However, in industries where two-part tari¤ contracts are used, restricting non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing arrangements might have a positive impact on social welfare when product di¤erentiation is weak.
